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INDEPENDENT AGENCIES-
INDEPENDENT FROM WHOM?
Program presented by the
Section of Administrative Law and
Regulatory Practice
American Bar Association
Washington, D.C.
October 14, 1988
S ALLY KATZEN: Welcome. My name is Sally Katzen. I have the
honor of serving as the Chair of the ABA Section of Administrative
Law and Regulatory Practice this year. With this program we officially
begin the fall meeting of the Section. We're delighted that so many of
you were able to attend. At the outset, I would like to extend our
deepest thanks to Chief Judge Robinson 0. Everett, the Chief Judge
of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals who provided these facilities and
has been so gracious, as have his colleagues, in welcoming us here.
Our subject this afternoon, is Independent Agencies-Independent
from Whom? To begin with basics, you might ask, what is an inde-
pendent agency? I started, as any sophisticated lawyer would, with a
dictionary, and found under the word independent the following def-
inition: Not affiliated with a larger controlling unit. Not subject to
another's authority or jurisdiction. Not relying on or requiring the
assistance of others. Not influenced by others, in the matters of opin-
ion, conduct, etc. Not looking to others for guidance. Refusing to ac-
cept help from or be obliged to others. Desirous of freedom. Do you
think that accurately describes your favorite regulatory agency in this
town? Does it describe any regulatory agency in this town?
The subject we are considering today-how independent is the in-
dependent agency and from whom is it independent-is one that has
caught the attention of political scientists, policy makers, academicians,
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and lawyers. It is not a new issue. And it is an issue on which reasonable
people can, and do, differ.
As I looked through the literature on this subject, I found a state-
ment by the Bronlow Commission in 1937 which said that "indepen-
dent agencies are, in reality, miniature independent governments set
up to deal with the railroad problem, banking problem, or the radio
problem. They constitute a headless fourth branch of the government,
a haphazard depository of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated
powers." Less than a year later I found another statement that said
that independent agencies are "thoroughly subject to control through
Congress, the courts, the executive and by the force of public opin-
ion." Are they out of control, are they over-controlled or are they
somewhere in between?
In the brochure describing the program, we observed that inde-
pendent agencies have been a battleground between those who think
they are an arm of Congress and those who see them as part of the
Executive Branch. The battle is all the more intense when, as in our
recent past, Congress and the White House have been controlled by
different political parties. Those who watched the debate last night
will have their own views toward whether that situation will continue.
Our speakers today were selected because they bring light as well as
heat to the debate. They come to this forum with very different per-
spectives. But one thing they have in common is real life experience
with this issue. We are extremely fortunate to have as our keynote
speaker Congressman Edward Markey of Massachusetts, Chairman of
the Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce. The Subcommittee has taken
a very active role in oversight. On our panel is the Honorable James
Miller, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Exec-
utive Branch's own form of oversight. Next is Commissioner Joseph
Grundfest of the Securities and Exchange Commission-an indepen-
dent agency. And then, Vice-Chairman R. Gaull Silberman of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission-an almost independent
agency. Last, but by no means least, is Professor Peter Strauss of the
Columbia University School of Law, who will provide a more objec-
tive, or some would say, academic evaluation of the situation. After
opening statements by the panelists we'll have any rebuttal comments
(you can see I have been influenced by the debates) and then take
questions from the floor.
So without further ado, I would like to introduce Congressman Mar-
key, who needs little introduction to those of us in the field of admin-
istrative law. He did his undergraduate work at Boston College and
received his law degree from Boston College Law School. He has spent
his entire professional life in the legislative branch. The year he grad-
uated fiom law school he was elected to the Massachusetts legislature.
And in 1976, he won a 12-way race for the Democratic nomination,
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and ultimately was elected to represent the Seventh District in the
House of Representatives. He quickly made a mark in Congress, rais-
ing a strong voice for consumers on energy issues and speaking against
nuclear proliferation, just to mention two of the issues with which he
has been involved. From 1981 to 1984 he served as the Chairman of
the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee of the Interior Com-
mittee, which has oversight responsibilities for the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. In 1985, he became the Chairman of the House Subcom-
mittee on Energy Conservation and Power and in 1987 he assumed
his present position as Chairman of the Telecommunications and Fi-
nance Subcommittee. It is a great privilege to welcome Congressman
Markey.
CONGRESSMAN MARKEY: Thank you.
What I would like to talk about is how we've gone through a period
in which there was pretty much a bipartisan consensus on the need for
the independent agencies' existence. Let's just begin with that premise
because even that is now in contention. I'd like to begin by noting that
in Congress we basically have committees which are drawn along cer-
tain functional lines. The Ways and Means Committee taxes every-
body. The Appropriations Committee spends all the money. The
Energy and Commerce Committee regulates everybody. We're the
Regulatory Committee. And so whether it be EPA, NASA, the SEC,
CFTC, the FCC, FSLIC, the FTC, just to name a few, almost all reg-
ulation, in some manner, shape or form, comes under ourjurisdiction,
somewhat, to the continuing dismay of the rest of the House of Rep-
resentatives. Nonetheless, that's the by-product of having Sam Ray-
burn and Jordan Engel, amongst others, as past Chairmen of your
Committee.
So as a result, I have had the personal responsibility for overseeing
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and FERC as a subcommittee
chair, and the SEC and the FCC as a subcommittee chair. I've had a
pretty good opportunity to look at those agencies up close, and at all
the rest which have come before our full committee. I've got a pretty
good sense of what's been going on going back to 1976, when I was
first elected to Congress. Throughout the 70s, there was a bipartisan
consensus on the role of, and need for, the regulations issued by the
independent agencies. Regulation was recognized as a vehicle for gov-
ernment to ensure a certain level of safety, security and stability in the
economy and the marketplace. Now these are hardly the goals of left-
wing, granola-chomping liberals. In fact, I believe that they are essen-
tially conservative values. You should remember that the EPA was
created by the Nixon administration. I will concede that by the end of
the 70s there was also a growing consensus that there was too much
government regulation and that some reassessment was called for-
and this helped to put Ronald Reagan in the White House.
But it was Jimmy Carter who did start to take the country down the
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deregulatory road with the trucking and airline industries, and it is
important to remember that Carter's goal was to promote competition.
So when he deregulated, it was to reduce barriers to entry while main-
taining consumer protection and antitrust goals. President Reagan's
deregulatory goal, on the other hand, went far beyond President Cart-
er's, and was contrary to the bipartisan consensus that had formed as
to where regulation was needed. Instead of recognizing that there may
have been 10 or even 20 percent too much regulation or red tape,
Reagan came in and effectively said that all regulation is bad. It was
deregulation without even the trappings of increasing competition. It
was the pursuit of deregulation for deregulation's sake. It was a de-
regulatory feeding frenzy. In fact, it was more than deregulation. It
was the denial of any legitimate role for government in ensuring min-
imum marketplace standards for safety, health and competition.
The independent agencies, as well as cabinet level departments, be-
came arenas where this deregulatory war was waged. It was fought
primarily with three weapons: first, the administration appointed peo-
ple whose goal was to quickly demolish the regulatory structure which
had been put in place during the first 200 years of the Republic. Sec-
ond, the administration set up the OMB and the Vice President's Task
Force on Regulatory Relief to put a stranglehold on regulations al-
ready in place and to prevent any new regulations from seeing the
light of day. Third, the administration simply denied the agencies the
money and staff they needed to get their jobs done.
Let me give some examples of how each of these weapons was used.
You may not remember James Edwards, a former dentist, who was
named President Reagan's first Secretary of Energy. At a hearing in
December 1981, SenatorJohn Glenn asked Edwards whether, in being
named Secretary of Energy, he had in fact been given the job of doing
away with the Department of Energy. "Yes sir, I have," responded the
dentist. Glenn asked Edwards when he thought he could accomplish
the task. Edwards replied (this is our Secretary of Energy speaking
now), "I hope to be back in South Carolina for hunting and fishing in
April or May." When told he was overly optimistic, Edwards said
cheerily, "the fishing is good in June or July, as well." Edwards never
succeeded and Reagan eventually gave up trying to abolish the entire
Department of Energy. But as it turned out, the administration's reg-
ulatory policy became the equivalent of a "gone fishing" sign hanging
on the door of most independent agencies and some departments.
Let me tell you another story which is a good illustration of how the
administration used both the power of appointment and the power
given to OMB in its attempt to cripple an independent agency. Dr.
John Hernandez eventually became Deputy Administrator of the EPA,
but was first interviewed for the top job by two men from David Stock-
man's office at OMB. This is in Ann Gorsuch's own autobiography; I
take this from her own writings. Here's how she described Hernandez'
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meeting with two people from OMB, deciding on his worthiness for
appointment at the EPA:
My meeting was with Glen Schleede, the number three man at OMB, and
Fred Khedouri, OMB's budget director for the EPA. I went into that
interview very cauiiously, because I knew that these people wanted to make
major cuts at EPA, so I was quite reluctant to say anything I didn't believe
in in the way of philosophy or approach. I was absolutely terrified of
becoming the head of EPA and all that mess it was in, so it was in the
forefront of my mind all during that meeting that anything I said to those
guys I would have to live with when I became the administrator and finally
at one point Fred Khedouri leaned over in his chair and quietlike but dead
serious asked 'Would you be willing to bring the EPA to its knees?' I was
so startled that I kind of just laughed as if I couldn't believe he had said
that. But he had said that and I just demurred. And when Ann Burford
was selected as head of EPA instead of me, I was very much relieved.
The EPA saga which subsequently unfolded is a good illustration of
the cavalier disregard for common sense and the common good dis-
played by the administration when it came to regulation. And as we
saw at the EPA, it could also mean a cavalier disregard for the law-
you can just ask Rita Lavelle about that. But even after the EPA fiasco,
the administration continued to violate the first law of holes, which is
that when you're in one, you should stop digging. In fact, its deregu-
latory policies could have filled a bottomless pit.
Let me talk for a moment about the Vice President's Task Force on
Regulatory Relief. These days, George Bush is running around New
Jersey and California claiming to be an environmentalist. Well, if you
look at his record as head of the Task Force and believe that, then
you'll probably believe him when he goes to Nashville next week and
claims that he is Elvis Presley, because there is as much truth in that
statement as there is that he was an environmentalist for the last 7/
years. Bush allowed California oil refineries and other industries to
operate despite Clean Air Act bans on new sources of air pollution in
poor air quality areas. Bush decided to delay EPA requirements that
the timber industry curb pollution; that municipal sewerage systems
control industrial pollution; and that dangerous pesticides be regu-
lated. He decided to allow vehicles to emit greater amounts of carbon
monoxide and other dangerous pollutants into our air. And he post-
poned a rule to limit worker's exposure to lead. This is the environ-
mental legacy of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief.
Now let me turn to the administration's third weapon in the war on
regulation-cutting staff and funding at independent agencies. Edwin
Gray, the former head of the FSLIC, had a run-in with the associate
director of OMBjust as the deregulatory drive was getting under way
in 1981. Gray told OMB about the potential problems that FSLIC
faced with savings and loans and banks throughout the country. He
told OMB that FSLIC really needed more examiners in the Federal
Home Loan Banks. Gray was told by OMB that he obviously didn't
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understand the administration's policy of deregulation-that meant
reducing, not increasing, the size of the examination staff. He was told
that the goal was to get the government out of, not into, the pockets
of business. Eventually OMB was generous enough to offer FSLIC
thirty-nine new examiners nationwide as their massive deregulatory
policies in the Federal Savings and Loan Bank area were being intro-
duced. Unfortunately, as we found out by 1986, FSLIC needed more
than 750 new examiners and we know what kind of condition FSLIC
is in today. We stand on the verge of one of the most expensive gov-
ernment/taxpayer bailouts in history. And what Gray makes very clear
is that yes, there are a lot of crooks and yes, some of this deregulation
went too far, but if you are going to do it you better put personnel in
place to accommodate a lot of the additional risk which society as a
whole runs when you have people engaged in fundamentally danger-
ous activities that affect other parts of society. The blind pursuit of
deregulation overlooked the pressing need for some governmental in-
tervention, as well as the fact that thrift losses might have to be paid
by taxpayers down the road.
The parallel experience of the Securities and Exchange Commission
to FSLIC is striking. Wall Street was booming throughout the 1980s.
Since 1981, the number of registered investment companies and ad-
visers has increased by 86 percent. The number of investors has in-
creased 46 percent and the number of shares traded on the New York
Stock Exchange has increased 186 percent. But as you might expect,
complaints to the SEC have also increased 55 percent. In 1985 and
'86, more than 450 insider trading investigations were referred to the
SEC by the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange,
the National Association of Securities Dealers and the Chicago Board
Options Exchange. Yet throughout the 1980s the SEC was consistently
given less employees by the administration than in its budget request-
hundreds of employees less. The SEC opened investigations into 208
of these insider trading referrals, less than half. The rest were lost in
the deregulatory black hole created by the administration's deregula-
tory policy. If you increase activity in the marketplace as a result of
deregulation and reduce the number of personnel who are on duty to
monitor it, then in that black hole will flourish the activity which en-
dangers investor confidence in the financial marketplace as a whole.
And the lesson taught on October 19, 1987, Black Monday, came as
a surprise to many. But I think the handwriting was on the wall long
before October 19, and the lesson is the same with FSLIC. Who pays
in the long run? Ask the small investor who got wiped out on Black
Monday and is afraid to return to the market.
I think the cases that I have spoken about, the EPA, FSLIC, the Vice
President's Task Force and the SEC are illustrative of problems caused
by the deregulatory drive, but there is no better example in the Reagan
era than the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Let me paraphraseJohn
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F. Kennedy and say this about the Reagan era NRC. It would weaken
any regulation, change any rule, befriend any utility and ignore the
health and safety of every citizen to keep this nation's nuclear power
plants running. This has been the record of the NRC over the past
eight years. It is an agency which has been stacked by the Reagan
administration with ideological zealots, and, as a result, the NRC has
become wedded to the Reagan administration's nuclear policies.
This couldn't be more clear than in the case of the Seabrook Nuclear
Power Plant. In a monumental mistake, this plant was sited virtually
on top of the beach in Seabrook, New Hampshire. Ninety-four percent
of New Hampshire is wooded, but the decision was made to build a
nuclear power plant in the middle of the only populated area, on a
beach and with just one two-lane road to evacuate upwards of half a
million people in the event of an accident. In the event of an accident
or meltdown, with crowds on the beach, and only one main thorough-
fare out of town, it has proven to be impossible to evacuate the citizens
who live within the ten-mile radius of the plant.
Both Massachusetts and New Hampshire have spent hundreds of
thousands, if not millions, of dollars, trying to design adequate emer-
gency response plans, but local safety officials have concluded that it
would be impossible to evacuate the area during a meltdown. Regu-
lations were adopted after Congress passed legislation requiring emer-
gency evacuation planning-effectively giving state officials a veto over
nuclear plant operation if they conclude that they can't adequately
provide for the safety of their citizens. The first time a state ever reached
that conclusion, the NRC changed its regulations.
The Reagan NRC was so determined to get Seabrook and Shoreham
on line it changed the rules on emergency evacuation planning after
the stptes had already invoked their rights under the existing regula-
tigns. Even though the NRC is allowed by statute only to use safety as
a basis for its decisions, and not economics (that's why we broke the
NRC off from the AEC back in 1974-75), the utilities now say that
the inexorable pressure of a mistaken investment made twelve years
earlier should override any and all safety considerations. Therefore,
they maintain, the plant should be licensed and off the books go reg-
ulations that had been relied upon by the states over all those years to
be used in any administrative or court procedures.
So, even after the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl,
and even with the consensus that followed that public protection is
needed, rather than work with communities to ensure public safety,
the Reagan NRC has instead tried to shut out public participation and
accommodate the nuclear industry. I fought the emergency organi-
zation planning question on the floor of the House in August of 1987.
My amendment was very simple-don't change health and safety rules
to fit a dangerous site. Change the site to fit the rules. It lost after what
most people commented was the most heavily lobbied amendment in
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the eighties on the floor of Congress. Just imagine every utility exec-
utive in America calling his Congressman on this issue. It was the eco-
nomics of the utility over public safety.
But the Seabrook opening will be litigated and it will go to the Su-
preme Court. I don't think there is any question about that, because
the fundamental question is the ability of federal agencies, indepen-
dent agencies, to play games with regulations that have been relied
upon by states.
A little insight here: The regulations which were on the books in
1975 said that you cannot litigate an emergency evacuation plan until
the plant is already built. Massachusetts went in and said we want to
litigate now, at the administrative level, because it is foolish to litigate
an emergency evacuation plan after the plant is built. Massachusetts
was told "no," the plant is going to be built, and under NRC regula-
tions. Your later rights will not be prejudiced and economics will not
play a role in any decision when the plant is finally completed. Mas-
sachusetts waits twelve years, comes in, and then the NRC takes the
regulation off the books, considers the economic cost of the invest-
ment, and attempts to ensure the operation of the $3 to $5 billion
dinosaur which is constructed on the Seabrook beach.
Let me give you one additional example of how far the Reagan
administration will go to keep plants running and keep the nuclear
utilities happy. In 1986, in a complete abdication of its regulatory re-
sponsibilities, the NRC capitulated to industry pressures and withdrew
fitness for duty regulations it had first proposed in 1982. These fitness
for duty rules would have imposed certain drug and alcohol testing
requirements on nuclear utilities for personnel operating nuclear power
plants. After all, is it inappropriate to expect that persons operating
the most dangerous technology known to mankind be sober and drug-
free? An accident could endanger the lives of hundreds of thousands
of people.
But even after the NRC's own drug abuse task force described "an
alarming increase in reported drug related incidents," and even after
its own staff proposed tough mandatory standards, the Commission
backed down and substituted an unenforceable policy statement on
drug and alcohol use which contained no reporting requirements. Since
then we have learned that the problem was much more serious than
the NRC Drug Task Force thought.
I have long been concerned with allegations of drug and alcohol
abuse during construction of the Seabrook plant. In late November
1986, when I was chair of the Subcommittee on Energy Conservation
and Power, I asked the NRC how many drug and alcohol abuse inci-
dents had been reported to it during the construction of the nuclear
power plant over the preceding twelve to fourteen years. The NRC
reported to me, as Chair of the Subcommittee of Jurisdiction in Con-
gress, that they had been able to identify nine instances of alleged
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alcohol and drug abuse at Seabrook during the construction of this
plant. I sent three of my staffers to the area surrounding the plant,
with instructions to talk to police officials, hospital officials, and to any
and all people who might be able to provide information from all rec-
ords available, as to how many drug and alcohol-related cases came to
the attention of the police and others during the time of construction.
We found that there were 561 incidents involving drug and alcohol
abuse at Seabrook between 1982 and 1987. Just five years and at the
end of construction-not at the beginning of the heavy construction
period. Five hundred and eighty-one-yet the NRC only knew of nine
at this nuclear power plant. It was so bad that the nuclear industry
itself could only find somewhere in the vicinity of 30 drug and alcohol
incidents nationwide-in the entire nuclear industry. My staff in two
months found 561 at one plant by talking to the local officials and to
the officials at the plant, asking for the documents.
I think that the words "benign neglect" charitably describe the NRC's
regulatory posture concerning drug and alcohol abuse at Seabrook
and other nuclear power plants. The fact that the Commission's prac-
tices could result in the NRC remaining ignorant of the discovery of
$10,000 worth of cocaine inside the protected area at Seabrook is in
itself a sharp indictment of the NRC as a regulatory agency, a regu-
latory agency constructed to have an exclusive responsibility for the
safety of nuclear power plants in our country.
Last month, the Commission finally proposed a fitness-for-duty rule
for nuclear power plants. There is drug testing but no alcohol testing.
The NRC made the decision to exclude alcohol to keep the utilities
happy, despite an incident last year where a plant manager turned up
drunk in the control room on New Year's Eve and began giving orders.
What is the bottom line result of this deregulatory approach that the
Reagan NRC has adopted? The Reagan NRC has become not a watch-
dog, but a lapdog for the nuclear utilities. Not a single new nuclear
power plant has been ordered since 1978, and no new plants have gone
on line since 1974. The remaining plants under construction, like Sea-
brook, are now running up costs of close to $3 to 4 billion and the fear
is that if they ever go on line they will be unsafe and expensive. Ulti-
mately, those living around the plants will pay for the deregulation
with their health, their safety and their hard-earned dollars.
And finally, as the Chairman of that Subcommittee over those years,
I can tell you with complete confidence that safety was the lost agenda
of an independent agency, which was deliberately constructed because
the Atomic Energy Commission had been unable to sort out the dif-
ference between being a regulator and a promoter of nuclear energy.
So, Congress set up a separate agency just to deal with the issue of
safety. And it lost that agenda. The agency once again became captive
to those from whom we had sought to set them free.
My responsibilities now with the Federal Communications Commis-
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sion bring me to pretty much the same conclusion, which is that right
through the Nixon, Ford and Carter years, there was pretty much of
a consensus on the need for sound, sensible regulations, and it really
didn't make a lot of difference whether it was a Democratic or Re-
publican administration. People tried to work together collectively to
produce consensus policy decisions. With the elevation of Mark Fowler
to the Chair of the Commission in 1981 and his statement that a tele-
vision is nothing more than a toaster with pictures, we realized that
perhaps he would not have the same view of the role which technology
plays in shaping values in this country.
There is a balance between the free market and the unintended
consequences of the free market in the effects upon the citizens of our
country. When the FCC decided to take the Fairness Doctrine off the
books, a law which for forty years had ensured that the public would
have access to the airwaves to discuss important public policy issues,
we began to realize that, even though Congress had voted 301 to 100
to keep it on the books, there was an ideological bent to the agency
which would pursue the deregulation even in the face of a broad-based
Democratic and Republican consensus that developed around it. My
general sense is, or my hope is, that, if and when George Bush or
Michael Dukakis ascend to the presidency, we will see a left-of-center
or a right-of-center presidency, but we will not see a right-wing ideo-
logical lean, Chicago School of Economics-grounded approach to all
issues, regardless of where common sense tells you that the market-
place is not working and that some type of government intervention
is necessary in order to protect the common good and the public good.
I believe that that era is in the offing, I pray that it is.
I will finish with this one comment. We are about to note the first
anniversary of the Crash of 1987. In the wake of that crash, a very
curious thing happened. The administration for the first time decided
that it would sit down with the Democrats to try to work out in a
bipartisan fashion a budget deal, with all issues on the table, Out of
that summit last December came a package which was developed largely
because we had been sent signals by our world trading partners that
they had begun to lose confidence in who we were as a nation: over-
leveraged, irresponsible, cavalier and dangerous to the world. We had
to send a signal. And that crisis forced the political dynamic to resolve
issues on a smart, pragmatic basis.
Simultaneously the administration empaneled the Brady Commis-
sion, led by Nicholas Brady and then populated by a long list of tra-
ditional conservative Republican economists and thinkers. That report
came back in mid-January 1988. It was not the product of liberals, it
was the product of conservative Republican traditionalists looking at
a problem pragmatically. They said that there was a problem between
the CFTC and the SEC and regulation, that stocks and options were
regulated by one party and futures by the other, and that somehow or
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other, there had been no real way of reconciling the problems that
developed as the products transformed themselves into futures and
then back into equity again. They said that there was a problem with
margins on stocks and options set by the Fed but with futures set by
the Merc, a private agency. They said that maybe we should have the
Fed, or some other agency, have sole responsibility for coordinating
these policies in a unified financial marketplace.
Nicholas Brady said to us as he introduced his report that there was
"a gun pointed at the economy of the United States and that gun is
still loaded." Well, no fundamental changes have been made since that
time. And in his confirmation testimony before the Senate last month,
Nick Brady said "Don't worry, be happy. There are no more prob-
lems. I tbink that everything is okay." I have great hopes that if, in
fact, we do go into a Bush era, that the Nicholas Bradys, the Jim Bakers
and others might be more pragmatic, might look at these issues in a
way in which the budget compromise of December 1987 and the Brady
Report of 1988 dealt with those issues. There is no liberal/conserva-
tive way of looking at it as far as I am concerned. I can't figure out
what a liberal perspective is on ensuring that people can get away from
a meltdown at a new nuclear power plant, or from a stock market that
drops 508 points in an afternoon.
In conclusion, let me summarize by saying the following: I think
what happened in our regulatory structure over the last seven and a
half years was an imposition of ideological right-wing philosophy that
ran fundamentally contrary to the tradition of our independent agen-
cies-which have been, up until the beginning of this decade, basically
problem-solvers. I thank you for this opportunity to be here with you.
Thank you.
SALLY KATZEN: Our next speaker is James C. Miller, Director of
the Office of Management and Budget. He did his undergraduate work
in Economics at the University of Georgia and received his Ph.D. in
that field at the University of Virginia. He served as the senior staff
economist at the Department of Transportation from 1969-1972. In
1974, he was appointed senior staff economist for the President's
Council of Economic Advisors, and in 1975, he was appointed Assis-
tant Director for Regulatory Review of the organization known as the
Council on Wage and Price Stability, an organization that I was briefly
associated with. After a period with the American Enterprise Institute,
as resident scholar and co-director for the Center for the Study of
Government Regulation, he was named as OMB's first Administrator
for Information and Regulatory Affairs, a position he held for eight
months in 1981, when he became Chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission. He has served as the Director of OMB since October
1985 and will do so through tomorrow.
I would like to add a personal note of thanks to him for finding time
to honor his commitment to us on this, his last full day in office, and
FALL 1989
41 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 491
my own regret that he is leaving government. We are very honored
to have him with us today and I would like now to turn the mike over
to Jim Miller.
JAMES MILLER: Thank you Sally. I leave government tomorrow with
enormous respect for the people I work with, with even greater ap-
preciation for the role of public service, and with great optimism for
the future. I appreciate this chance to be with you today.
Let me begin by saying that independent agencies should not be
independent.* I believe that for policy as well as for constitutional
reasons.
When I was Chairman of the FTC, I often asked myself the following
question: "To whom am I accountable?" Often, it seemed, the answer
would be: "To 435 Congressmen, 100 Senators, and the President
himselfl" On many occasions, however, the answer would be: "As long
as I apply a modicum of discretion, I am accountable to no one." This
answer, I submit, is evidence of a major institutional defect, for it means
that at least one official, with rather broad latitude for public good or
public harm, occasionally did not feel accountable. Such a situation
would be far less likely if the official in question had been more closely
supervised by the President and his assigns.
In addition to insufficient accountability, there are other policy rea-
sons why I believe the independence of independent agencies is a bad
idea. Consider the problem of policy coordination. In the area of an-
titrust, for example, there is a compelling need for the FTC to coor-
dinate its policies with those of the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice. While a considerable amount of such coordination does go
on, the Commission has been reluctant to get involved in certain per-
tinent, though higher-level, executive branch policy activities. (I re-
member well the objections raised by Senator Arlen Specter to the
FTC's representation on a White House working group coordinating
commercial policy.)
A related shortcoming of "independence" is that independent agen-
cies have "no place at the table" when it comes to formulating policies
that directly affect the agency. It is difficult enough for non-cabinet
executive agencies to feel fully informed and to be represented at the
highest levels of government decisionmaking. But the independent
agencies have little voice in such deliberations nor the efficient means
to gather information from such proceedings.
Let me hasten to point out that thus far I've been reflecting upon
the executive functions of independent agencies. Of course, when agen-
cies-independent or otherwise-engage in adjudicatory functions, I
believe that strict independence must be maintained.
As for the constitutional reasons why independence is a bad idea, I
*The material that follows was subsequently printed in 1988 DUKE L.J. 297.
Independent Agencies 503
shall leave it to those trained in the law to elucidate. Suffice it to say,
however, that INS v. Chadha and its progeny would appear to shake
the foundation of the house of cards built upon Humphrey's Executor
v. United States.
A few additional observations. First, in my experience, "outside con-
tacts" from government officials that were (or bordered upon being)
improper were almost always generated at the Capitol Hill end of
Pennsylvania Avenue rather than at the White House end. In the vast
majority of cases, it was merely an instance of a Congressman or Sen-
ator responding to some constituent's plea and not realizing the sen-
sitivity of the contact (with my office). Thus, I developed a quick and
ready response whenever such a call was received. It went like this:
"Congressman (or Senator), before you get into that, I'm sure you
must be calling me about the merits of the issue, not the politics. And
since you are calling me about the merits, I think it vitally important
that you place all such materials in the public record. Let me assure
you that we will give due consideration to any and all views that may
be pertinent to this case. Of course, we will have to make ourjudgment
on the merits in each instance." Not inconsistent with this policy, I
would always, "as a favor," agree to visit with anyone a Congressman
or Senator insisted that I meet. I would also hear their pitch. But I
refused to give any "special consideration" to their "connections" and
courteously communicated the same to any congressional caller.
Beyond a number of "outside contacts" with regard to specific mat-
ters, I encountered a plethora of congressional (and a few executive)
pressures-some of which were constructive in that they reinforced
the notion of accountability, but most were not. The head of an in-
dependent agency must be especially vigilant to protect the preroga-
tives of the agency against vested interests. Being outside the shelter
and protection afforded by the President, independent agency officials
are more open to "hits" by members of Congress and the media. With
a far greater frequency than that experienced by executive officials,
appointees to independent agencies are fair game for congressional
theatrics and their supporters in the media. While that is to be ex-
pected ("it goes with the job"), it means that independent agencies
must be specially resilient and careful in order to maintain the morale
and credibility necessary for efficient functioning. (Of course, one way
of ameliorating this problem is to eliminate the distinction between
executive and independent agencies.)
In conclusion, I believe it would be wise to eliminate completely the
distinction afforded independent agencies. The executive as well as
adjudicatory functions of independent agencies can be accomplished
perfectly well by executive officials serving at the pleasure of the Pres-
ident.
QUESTION: Jim, I've never understood why, as head of OMB, you've
never called an agency head not in the adjudicatory context, but in
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the rulemaking context. Why the Reagan administration, with its en-
thusiasm for various forms of impact statements, never said to the
independent agencies, this makes sense for you too, it really does. Is
that simply a political judgment?
JAMES MILLER: Well, Vice President Bush made a cut on that early
on-we would not apply Executive Order 12291 to the independent
agencies.
QUESTION: You could.
JAMES MILLER: We could; the Justice Department concluded we
could. But the Vice President concluded this would be unwise. Instead,
he sent a letter asking the independent agencies to make their rule-
makings in accord with the requirements of the executive order. Most
said they'd take the issue under advisement or something like that, but
none chose not to comply with the requirements of the executive or-
der. And none to my knowledge, including the FTC even when it had
a Reagan majority, took the initiative to comply with the order. Prob-
ably I should have tried such a thing; it would have been very contro-
versial, I'm sure.
QUESTION: Just because of congressional politics?
JAMES MILLER: Oh, yes. You know the old story about the chicken?
It breaks out of its shell and calls as mother whoever happens to be
closest around. Independent agencies tend to hear from Congress and
think of Congress as their mother; they don't hear much from the
executive branch of government-not from the President or his im-
mediate assigns. So if there's asymmetry here-and I believe there is-
it's skewed toward domination of independent agencies by Congress,
not by the executive branch.
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: And even those of us who have complied
with that executive order, and who regularly send over our compila-
tions of what policymaking we're going to do, rarely hear about it, and
basically we tend not to put on those lists things that are controversial,
because if you do, then you're going to get problems. I'm not sure how
effective it all is.
JAMES MILLER: I hope I didn't misspeak. Since I've been Director
of 0MB, I have called the head of an executive branch agency about
some rulemaking they were engaged in, but no independent agency
people, and certainly nothing having to do with adjudication.
QUESTION: I'm puzzled about this particular issue that Peter asked
you about. Are you suggesting that political communications about
prospective rules are undesirable? You know there is a journal which
you are personally very well familiar with, Regulation, and you're also
very well familiar with the former Chair of this Section, Nino Scalia,
who wrote a marvelous article lambasting a case called Home Box Office,
and I'm kind of puzzled as to whether you're saying, you kind of in-
dicated that one of the arguments that there ought not to be a dis-
tinction between independent agencies and executive agencies was
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because there wasn't much political communication, you said with re-
spect to the independent agencies and I guess I'm asking do you think
there ought to be? Nino makes a very convincing case that Home Box
Office of course was wrong and there could be ex parte communica-
tions, particularly about political matters as a means of securing ac-
countability of agencies. Putting aside whatever the law may be at the
moment, I'm curious as to what you think.
JAMES MILLER: You mean, what I would recommend.
QUESFION: Yes.
JAMES MILLER: Not what I would do.
QUESTION: No, what you recommend.
JAMES MILLER: I think the President or his assigns should feel free
to communicate with independent agencies, but I draw a line between
rulemaking and adjudication. For example, the President of the United
States says, "You have before you, Federal Trade Commission, the
prospect of suing in court to enjoin a merger between companies A
and B; you should do that." In my judgment, we should to that. On
the other hand, if we had voted out a complaint on the matter and the
President called up to say we should find them guilty or should let
them off the hook, I'd say: "Mr. President, it is improper for you to
be contacting me about this matter, and furthermore I'm going to put
a memorandum of your call and my response to you on the record."
QUESTION: I'm talking strictly about rulemaking.
JAMES MILLER: Specifically with respect to rulemaking and even
less formal policymaking, I think the President and/or his assigns should
have complete authority to direct the independent agencies. For ex-
ample, if the President called up and said to the FTC, you've got this
deception standard before you and I think you should tailor it in such
and such a way, I would feel obligated to carry out his wishes. Of
course, let me add that such a scenario is extremely unlikely.
SALLY KATZEN: I think we should continue with the other panel-
ists, if we can.
Having heard from Capitol Hill and the executive branch, we turn
now to the representatives from the agencies. Our next speaker is both
a lawyer and an economist. He did his undergraduate work in eco-
nomics at Yale, and then earned an M.B.S. in mathematical economics
and econometrics at the London School of Economics. He received
his J.D. from Stanford Law School, and was in private practice at Wil-
mer, Cutler & Pickering here in Washington (another organization
that I have been associated with). He left to assume the position of
Counsel and Senior Economist for Legal and Regulatory Matters on
the President's Council of Economic Advisors. In October of 1985 he
became Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
We welcome Commissioner Joseph Grundfest.
JOSEPH GRUNDFEST: Thank you Sally. I'm going to try to follow a
very logical progression. As you noticed, Congressman Markey was
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standing up at the podium; Jim Miller, who after all is only from the
administration, was standing here at the table; and since I'm from an
independent agency, I'm going to relax along with the rest of you and
I will continue to sit.
The topic of what I would like to discuss will follow along with the
topic of this meeting-Independent Agencies: Independent From
Whom?-and what I would like to discuss is reality versus the theory
of that topic. I will use my experience over the last year at the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission as a case study of reality versus theory
on the issue of independence.
First, what I would like to do is balance the extent of contacts I
myself have experienced from Capitol Hill and from the administra-
tion. Second, I would like to explore some material that might be fa-
miliar to everyone in this room-that would be the legal standards
governing some of those contacts, aside from the usual Administrative
Procedure Act considerations. Third, I would like to share with you
that the major issue of independence may well not have anything to
do with the commissions' or commissioners' independence from either
end of Pennsylvania Avenue, but as a practical matter-and remember
we are talking reality versus theory-the practical question of inde-
pendence may well be, can a commission be independent of its own
staff? Fourth, Congressman Markey raised the issue of funding for the
SEC, and I am sorry he is not here as I would like to raise some points
in response to a couple of things he said, and it is impossible to be from
the SEC and speak in public without mentioning the Crash of '87. So
again, I would like to pick up on a couple of observations that might
be left in the wake of Congressman Markey's remarks.
First, the issue of reality versus theory, and the extent of influence
from the administration as opposed to the extent of influence from
Capitol Hill. I think it's fair to say that influences from Capitol Hill
are far more persistent and insistent than any influences from the
administration. It is possible to explain that I think with the broad
oversight responsibility that Congress sees for itself, but if one sits back
and does a bit of an inventory, as I have over the last couple of days,
and compares the extent of the influence, it really is quite remarkable.
I have searched my files, alright, and maybe I have missed something;
but, after a diligent search conducted by my confidential assistants,
interviews with my legal counsel, a review of records and to the best
of my recollection, I hold here in my right hand the sum total of all
written communications that I have received from the administration,
and that is from OMB and from the Council of Economic Advisors
over the last twelve months. I have got a letter from Beryl Sprinkle
involving an issue of arbitration, and then I have two letters very sim-
ilar-one from CEA, one from OMB-having to do with matters in-
volving rule 19(c)(4)-one share, one vote. All of these are available
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in the public file; all of them were, as a practical matter, immediately
made public upon their arrival at the Commission.
With regard to the question of independence, how did these two
letters influence me? I can tell you that on the one share, one vote
matter, I disagreed with the position that the administration took;
ironically, I disagreed with the position because I believe that markets
work better than elections and the admininistration's position, I think,
would rely too much on electoral mechanisms in the corporate sphere,
and I thought we had fashioned a rule that was actually more market-
oriented than the position the administration was relying on. There-
fore, I disagree with Beryl and with the Office of Management and
Budget. With regard to the second issue, mandatory arbitration in 34
act cases, the position that I have taken is that we do not yet have
enough information to reach an intelligent conclusion about what po-
sition to take on that issue, so I have not come down either on Con-
gressman Markey's side yet, or on the side of the administration. We
are in the process of gathering some of that information, and we are
going to fish or cut bait at some time in the near future.
So with regard to influence from these letters, the administration
was nothing for one on the one issue where it has been decided. In
contrast to the information that I have received in the written mate-
rials from the administration, this is my file of congressional materials;
these are the materials from Congress and some of our responses to
Congress, and I have a much greater degree of certainty that this is
not a complete stack of materials whereas this [administration file] is
a complete stack. When you get something from the administration,
it is such a rare event that you check the name on the envelope to make
sure it wasn't sent to you by mistake as a practical matter. If you were
to look through the topics discussed in these materials, it really would
be quite remarkable. It covers virtually anything and everything that
comes before the SEC from the most important and significant to al-
most the most trivial and benign. The most interesting letter in this
whole stack comes from Edward J. Markey and I am sorry that Con-
gressman Markey is not here. In order to understand the background
of this letter, I would like to read the last paragraph of the letter re-
garding arbitration that Beryl Sprinkle sent to the SEC.
Beryl wrote:
The Council-meaning the Council of Economic Advisors-cannot help
but be concerned by the series of interventions in the Securities Markets
which have been proposed and considered in the last year. Many of these
proposals would have the effect of increasing the regulation of the secu-
rities markets in a manner that is fundamentally inconsistent with the policy
of this administration. While this proposal focuses on a narrow area, it is
representative of the type of interference with freedom of contract and
market processes which the president, time and again, has opposed in the
strongest terms. We will not hesitate to express our opposition to this
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legislation and any other legislation of a similar tenor.
Alright, that is a letter to the SEC that was publicly available and it
came from Beryl Sprinkle. Part of the response, and I am not leaving
out any of the good stuff, I can guarantee you, from Ed Markey reads
as follows: "I note at the outset that the SEC [and this is a letter to
Chairman Sprinkle from Ed Markey] has a distinguished history as a
fiercely independent agency, and that this independence is both nec-
essary and appropriate. I am informed by the agency that it is not its
practice to solicit the views of the White House on matters the SEC
has under consideration-which might result in legislative Action-
nor is it customary for the CEA on its own initiative to proffer its
opinion on such matters. Aside from the merits of outlawing manda-
tory arbitration clauses, which I believe to constitute contracts of adhe-
sion, your letter implies that the SEC should not pursue interventions
in the market because such a course is inconsistent with the ideology
of the incumbent administration. This is a disturbing interpretation
of, and intrusion into, the Commission's independent status. As you
are aware, the SEC was created by Congress in partial response to the
laissez-faire attitudes that prevailed up to, and throughout, the Roar-
ing Twenties. The unfounded fear of regulation that shaped policy
during those years contributed to the collapse of the stock market and
of the American economy. Administrations come and go and regula-
tory philosophies change, and since its inception, the SEC has been
charged by the Congress with the mandate of investor protection. The
administration should recognize that it is not inconsistent with the
Commission's history or purpose that it should prescribe limitations
on the relationships which its regulated broker dealers can impose upon
their customers. The CEA might prefer to see regulation directed by
the invisible hand of the market, but that is not what our securities
laws contemplate. I call the SEC's initiatives in 1988, many of which
strike me as hopeful for the cause of investor protection. This is a
principle inherently intent of Congress and creating the SEC and re-
mains central to that agency's ongoing mission."
I would submit to you that a large part of Congressman Markey's
concern is not over the extent of the participation or the views ex-
pressed by the Council of Economic Advisors, but the fact that those
were not his views and that there was a disagreement between Con-
gressman Markey and the administration on this issue and that had
the administration supported Congressman Markey's views, we would
have received a letter saying as you observe you have received letters
from CEA supporting our position and when you have got Congress
and you have got the administration all pointing in one direction, why
aren't you, SEC, independent agency, marching along with us. I think
as a practical matter much of the debate that one often hears in this
area is, quite candidly, goal-oriented. If independent means that you
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are going to disagree with us, oh no, you are not independent. You
don't understand, you are a creature of Congress. You have to do what
we are doing, don't you read the votes, don't you know we just had a
vote 300 to 100, how could you possible be independent of that. On
the other hand, if you are doing what we think is right for you to do,
then in that case, you are exercising your best independent judgment.
It is not a surprising situation-Washington is a political town. One
learns to live in that kind of an environment relatively quickly, if not
comfortably or easily. I should also say that written contacts are not
the only ones that one gets in this town. We have telephones, and
people have our telephone numbers. My personal experience is that if
I were to estimate a ratio of Hill contacts to administration contacts, I
would say that I would probably get 30 Hill contacts for every contact
with anyone related to the administration where any SEC business is
discussed at all. I can tell you that in every single one of those calls,
what a person is generally asked for has usually been from the staff
level. They have asked for publicly available information-where can
I get a copy of your 19(c)(4) release, where can I get some of the
background-really, it is the kind of situation where, because of per-
sonal acquaintances, I wind up playing the role of a law librarian for
some people in the administration. That is the extent of all phone
conversations that I have received along those lines.
In terms of where can an administration or Congress go wrong, if
one looks at case law, one generally finds that problems of undue in-
fluence arise as a result of excessive intervention of Congress, not by
the administration. Pillsbury v. FTC, which is a case probably familiar
to most of you in this room, looks to the importance of noninterference
with mental decisional processes of members of the agency. Standard
Oil v. FTC is a fascinating case having to do with influence and the
decision to bring the case in that situation. The FTC commenced an
informal investigation of Standard Oil but took no investigatory steps
for seventeen months. Senator Jackson of the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations asked the FTC for an explanation of the relationship
between certain practices of the petroleum industry and then-current
oil shortages. One day after that request was received, the FTC issued
subpoenas to three Standard Oil officers, and shortly thereafter, sent
SenatorJackson a report on its investigation of the petroleum industry.
When Senator Jackson released the report, the FTC commenced this
action against Standard Oil. In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that
there was reason to believe that the agency did not have a sufficient
basis in filing its civil complaint, and there may have been overinflu-
ence from Capitol Hill. The D.C. Circuit in 1971, in D.C. Federation
of Civic Associations v. Volpe, looked at the possibility of threats from
Capitol Hill intruding into what it called the "calculus of considera-
tion" at the independent agency. There, the Secretary of Transpor-
tation's order came shortly after a member of the House Appropriations
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Committee threatened that if bridge construction were not ordered
promptly, the Congressman would recommend the withholding of
funds necessary for the completion of the much-needed city subway
system. There the court held that the action by the member of Con-
gress intruded into the "calculus of consideration" on which the Sec-
retary's decision was based.
My third observation is that if one looks at independence and one
looks at the battle between Capitol Hill and the administration, one
might be overlooking an important problem that often lies underneath
an independent commissioner's nose, and that is the question of in-
dependence from staff. Staff, in our case, I think is extraordinarily
talented but is also very strong-willed. The experience that I have gen-
erally had is that staff will be very solicitous of Capitol Hill, and will
be sure that when there is a rulemaking proposal or anything of that
sort, everything that Capitol Hill might be sensitive about is dealt with
in the proposing release or in the adopting release, and that all those
i's are dotted, all the t's are crossed and the appropriate Hill staffers
have been contacted about what is likely to happen given their level
of interest in the matter-particularly when we have an upcoming
adopting release. On the other hand, to the best of my knowledge,
there is not contact between the staff and anybody in the administra-
tion to find out whether the administration may have any concerns in
this area. There is no effort that I have ever seen to try to put infor-
mation into a release in order to address any concerns that the staff
might believe in its own mind that the administration might have, while,
by the same token, there is generally far more effort that I see invested
in trying to respond to possible concerns that may exist on Capitol
Hill, the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue.
With regard to the funding issue, I think it is obvious that unless
you have reached the point that economists call net negative marginal
returns, if you give us more money, yes, we can do more; that is a point
not worth debating. However, it is also obvious that resources in our
government are not infinite, they are finite. And when we come to the
question of whether the SEC should have more money, we also in the
same breath have to answer the question, from where? If we give more
money to the SEC, from where do we take it? Does that mean that we
spend less money on AIDS research; does that mean that we spend less
money on housing for the homeless; does it mean that we spend less
money on defense; or does it mean that we decide to live with the
bigger deficit? You give me another dollar to spend at the SEC, I can
do a pretty good job with it and I know what we can do with it. And
in many ways, I think it can be a very sensible thing. But I have got to
compete with other demands in our system. But I have a hard time
telling you that giving me another dollar is more sensible at this point
than spending another dollar on housing for the homeless or for AIDS
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research. That is a tougher question, and I have to leave it to other
branches of the government to resolve that problem.
Finally, when it comes to the question of the crash, let me tell you
that there is bad news and there is good news. As I see it, the bad news
is that since the October 19 crash, the federal government has done
relatively little. The good news is that since the October 19 crash, the
federal government has done relatively little. If one looks at the ex-
perience of 1929, one will observe that the period following the crash
from a microeconomic perspective-which is, after all, the most im-
portant perspective-things did not appear and the government re-
action in the wake of the crash created a problem far more serious
than the crash itself. To date-and who knows what will happen in
the next Congress, and who knows what'll happen in the next admin-
istration-we have avoided repeating those mistakes of 1929. The ex-
perience of October 19 certainly pointed out many shortcomings in
the operation of the nation's capital markets, and there are many things
that can and should be done. I'm afraid, however, that Congressman
Markey and I might not agree on many of those points, and looking
particularly at the question of jurisdiction, I don't think the location
of lines on an organization chart had anything to do with the market
going down 508 points on one Monday in October. Even if one thinks
that taking jurisdiction over index futures away from the CFTC and
the SEC is the answer to the problem, I would observe that one gen-
erally does not want to fight a land war in Asia. And if you have ever
seen a battle ofjurisdiction among congressional committees, you would
prefer to fight a land war in Asia than get involved in the midst of that
kind of dispute. I would look to send to Congressman Markey and I
could understand why he would want the SEC to havejurisdiction that
would increase thejurisdiction of his oversight committee; but, for him
to get that jurisdiction, he's going to have to arm-wrestle with the
House Agriculture Committee, and the Senate Banking Committee is
going to have to arm-wrestle with the Senate Agriculture Committee.
I can tell you, given the amount of energy and time and political ac-
rimony that would be involved in that kind of dispute, I can take all
of those resources, and I think if applied in a cooperative fashion, we
can do more for America's capital markets than spending all that time,
effort and energy involved in the political equivalent of guerilla war-
fare up on Capitol Hill. Thank you.
SALLY KATZEN: Thank you very much.
Next we welcome a graduate of Smith College (and by now it should
come as no surprise to you that it is another organization with which
I had been associated ). Ms. Silberman began her service in govern-
ment in 1974 when President Nixon appointed her to the National
Advisory Council on the Education of Disadvantaged Children. After
serving as the head of the Board of the Widening Horizons, which
works closely with the D.C. Board of Education on Career Planning
FALL 1989
41 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 491
for Inner City Students, Ms. Silberman spent two years in Yugoslavia
accompanying her husband, the U.S. ambassador. Upon her return,
she served as a consultant to the Republican National Senatorial Com-
mittee and, in 1978, she began her stint on Capitol Hill working with
Senator Packwood of Oregon.
In 1983, she began her tenure with regulatory agencies, serving first
as a special assistant to an FCC commissioner. In 1985, she was sworn
in as a Commissioner at the EEOC, and I already apologized that her
name tag is wrong, as she was designated Vice Chairman of the EEOC
in 1986. We look forward to hearing the views of Vice-Chairman Sil-
berman.
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: Thank you. I am really delighted to be here
to explore the question Independent Agencies-Independent Of (or
From) Whom: I'm not sure, Sally, which it is-it switched in the mid-
dle.
Now generally, this question is asked in terms of the separation of
powers. Are these entities independent of the executive branch? Are
they independent of the legislative branch? Or, as some have said, do
they constitute a fourth (I think the word is) headless branch of gov-
ernment, independent of both? I would like to draw on my four years
of experience at the EEOC and suggest that we not focus on the ab-
stract question of independence, but on what or who influences agen-
cies, and when' and whether those influences affect the way agencies
function within the statutory parameters that the Congress sets for
them. Or, if I may immediately establish my bona fides as a nonlawyer
in this group, and put it this way in plain English: Who's putting it to
whom, and really does it matter?
Now the EEOC is not a paradigm of an executive, an independent
or even a quasi-independent agency, although today we have all the
classic characteristics of an independent regulatory agency. We're a
multi-member, politically appointed panel with fixed terms; we have
no more than a majority of one party; and, we operate under a very
specialized mandate. We have a measure of discretionary authority
over matters such as budget, relations with Congress and positions
taken in litigation. We have the power to conduct on-the-record ad-
judicative hearings, investigations and bring enforcement actions in
court; we have broad rulemaking authority (which is what I'm going
to focus on); and there are restrictions on the President's power to
remove us. But this has not always been the case.
Congress established the EEOC in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
an executive branch agency, albeit multi-member and politically ap-
pointed. But the EEOC's authority was severely limited. In effect, we
were a claims adjustment agency operating in the emotionally charged
era of newly defined civil rights. By 1972, Congress realized the agen-
cy's authority was woefully inadequate to carry out its statutory man-
date and gave the EEOC prosecutorial power. Congress was unwilling
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then, and continues to be unwilling, to give us cease and desist power.
Later, in a presidential reorganization in 1979, authorized by an act
of Congress, enforcement authority, and with it, the substantive rule-
making authority for the Age Discrimination and Employment Act,
was transferred from the Department of Labor to the EEOC. That
same reorganization also gave us broad quasi-judicial authority for fed-
eral sector equal employment opportunity.
This transfer of authority from the executive department should
have clarified the agency status; yet, confusion remained, and I was
reminded in listening to Congressman Markey about a discussion to
which I was privy. Chairman Thomas-the Chairman of our Com-
mission-was testifying in front of the House Subcommittee and Over-
sight Committee, and he was castigated by the Chairman of that
Committee about the EEOC's "kowtowing" to OMB and "kowtow-
ing" to the Department ofJustice, and the Chairman banged his hand
on the table and said, "Why aren't you exercising more indepen-
dence?" Chairman Thomas explained to the Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee that we were, after all, an executive branch agency and the
Congressman railed that the Congressional Research Service would
certainly prove the Chairman wrong and that he was going to make
sure that they did. Now this Congressman, to his credit, six months
later on publication of the CRS opinion, publicly admitted his error.
But I think the story speaks volumes about influence, and that brings
me back to the subject of influence.
Obviously, whether independent, executive or somewhere in be-
tween, all agencies are influenced by Congress and by the President,
influence which is by constitutional design. Congress writes the laws
that establish agencies, sets the statutory parameters for our actions,
and the President executes those laws. The President sets budget
priorities and the Congress votes the money-and those are realities
of which no agency is independent. But in the modern administrative
state, the executive and the Congress are not the only players. I was
interested that Joe Grundfest was talking about the staff. I would like
to bring up another player, and that is the interest groups. The interest
groups exert power and greatly influence how an agency such as the
EEOC functions.
Now, Congress has given the EEOC prosecutorial, adjudicatory and
legislative functions. It's been my experience-and this has been echoed
again and again today-that rarely, if ever, is significant influence
brought to bear when we prosecute or when we adjudicate. The Con-
gress, the executive, even the interest groups, seem unwilling to try to
affect individual case outcome. The struggle is over policymaking, and
the policy made on a case-by-case basis is too incremental to draw their
attention. They'd rather leave it to the courts.
That is not so with respect to rulemaking. Here influence, particu-
larly that of the interest groups, has seriously challenged the EEOC's
FALL 1989
41 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 491
authority, expertise, and even its ability, to function within congres-
sionally dictated statutory parameters. Now Congress has delegated
much legislative authority to the experts, to the agencies; in part, be-
cause of their expertise, but in part because it is politically expedient.
Here I'd like to quote John Hart Ely: "How much more comfortable
it must be to simply vote in favor of a bill calling for safe cars, clean
air, or nondiscrimination, and to leave to others the chore of fleshing
out what such a mandate might mean. How much safer, too, and here
we get to the nub," says Ely, "for the fact seems to be that on most
hard issues, our representatives quite shrewdly prefer not to stand up
and be counted, but rather to let some executive branch bureaucrat,
or perhaps some independent regulatory commission, take the inevi-
table political heat." Congress may delegate some of its legislative au-
thority, but that delegation is conditioned on the agency's not
overstepping some undefined Maginot Line. Before Chadha, the leg-
islative veto was Congress' ultimate influence on regulatory outcomes.
Post-Chadha, the Congress retains a de facto veto often exercised, in
our case, after an interest group has drawn a post facto line. A footnote
on my experience: Even in policymaking, a weakened executive exerts
its influence in less direct, and, I have to tell you frankly, much less
effective ways.
I'd like to illustrate with a recent EEOC war story. A Sixth Circuit
ruling, which was later reversed en banc, would have required the EEOC
to supervise all private settlements between employees and employers
in which ADEA rights were involved. The administrative, as well as
philosophical, implications of this were awesome. Here was an appro-
priate point to put our seldom-used rulemaking authority to work. The
rulemaking process results in credible, consistent and predictable pol-
icy. It's more open, more democratic, and therefore more desirable.
So why not use it? Why indeed. We issued a Notice of Proposed Rule-
making (NPRM) asking for on-the-record comment. Our experts were
instructed by these comments and we promulgated a final rule that
voluntary and knowing settlements under the ADEA-which, by the
way, isjust like Title VII-were legal as long as certain standards were
met. But, as it turned out, there was nothing final about that rulemak-
ing because the AARP, the American Association of Retired Persons,
didn't like the rulemaking.
Now, in our judgment, the final rule preserved certain important
options for older workers while providing safeguards against intimi-
dation and other forms of undue pressure. The AARP worried about
the impact of early retirement on the Social Security system and ques-
tioned the ability of older workers to make the decision to retire early
or not, in return for a cash benefit, unless aided by the government.
They took their disagreement to Congress and when the AARP talks,
Congress listens.
Let me tell you about post-final rule influence: an unprecedented,
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year-long congressional investigation into EEOC enforcement and pol-
icymaking under the ADEA. You had to fight your way into our office,
for investigators from the Aging Committee were there all year poring
over the files. We actually had to close for a whole week in order to
respond to their requests. Multiple oversight hearings followed, and I
mean multiple.
The President's 1988 budget request for the agency was cut by $14
million and I wish Congressman Markey were here so that I could take
exception to his discussion of the congressional funding of important
programs and how this administration has cut that funding. Every year
that President Reagan has been in office, he has requested more money
for the EEOC, the premier civil rights enforcement organization in
the government, than the Congress-the Democratic Congress-has
authorized. So this year we got a $14 million cut (that's 10 percent of
our budget in a labor-intensive agency), and, in a final coup-de-grace,
in a midnight appropriation session, Senator Metzenbaum threatened
to cut off the salaries of the commissioners if we enforced the rule-
making. That was very influential, very influential. Ultimately, Con-
gress ordered us not to spend any money to give effect to the rule
during fiscal 1988. The AARP has kept up the pressure with efforts
in the last few months to introduce substantive legislation which would
nullify the rule. If those efforts fail, the suspension will continue.
So, in the final analysis, the conditions for delegation of legislative
authority were not met. And I might note in response to something
that Jim Miller said about the protection that the executive branch
gives executive branch agencies, when the Congress pulled the plug
on this executive branch agency's rule no executive was there to pro-
tect us. The rule went down the drain. Now, obviously, an experience
like this is a powerful disincentive to rulemaking. Our staff was dis-
heartened: two years of their work had gone into the rule. During our
congressional trials, the staff burned the midnight oil and watched as
precious resources were spent responding to unreasonable congres-
sional oversight-resources they knew should have been spent, and
needed to be spent, prosecuting cases. Their professionalism was chal-
lenged by repeated assaults on the commission's integrity. Our bu-
reaucracy was not captured. It was wounded, it was punished. And I
think that may be because our bureaucrats have a stake in the agency's
success and well-being, and I have to tell you that's a stake that I don't
think is unique to the EEOC. But such pressure takes its toll on political
appointees as well. This was vividly illustrated in a rulemaking sequel.
The federal sector complaint process is a disaster which everybody,
and I mean everybody, agrees must be fixed. After six years of formal
and informal consultation with Congress and other agencies, and
countless hours of staff work. The Commission issued, or tried to issue,
a notice of proposed rulemaking. It came up for a vote and was voted
down. Now, you all know that's very unusual for a notice of proposed
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rulemaking to be voted down at that stage. I believe-I know-that
the major reason was disquiet on the part of my colleagues with the
process of rulemaking, with the prospect of taking another flogging
from the interests and with the prospect of taking another flogging
from Congress. According to the Administrative Procedure Act, this
was the appropriate time for public comment, to get the input which
would provide the basis for changes. But this time the civil rights lobby
was concerned that the NPRM had set the agenda without prior dis-
cussions with them and that that would dictate a final rule not to their
liking. They misread the Commission. They doubted our open-mind-
edness, and they were able to prevent the agency from acting and thus,
the public from even commenting. In effect, they preempted the del-
egated function of rulemaking.
Now, when I first got to the EEOC, I was puzzled by what seemed
to me to be the rather fuzzy nature of policy formulation and pro-
mulgation. I believed then, and I still believe, that the rulemaking
process produces credible, predictable and accountable policy. Con-
gress intended that policy be made in the open; it's more democratic,
it's more desirable. I've learned, however, that the more overt the
policymaking, the more endangered the agency's independence. Bet-
ter to make policy through adjudication and prosecution. It's safer
because it's incremental and you present a moving target. You can be
a lot more independent but that independence is achieved with timid-
ity, which is really no independence at all. Abstract questions of desir-
able governmental organization and procedures are overwhelmed by
political realities.
SALLY KATZEN: Thank you very much. Our last speaker is Profes-
sor Peter Strauss of Columbia Law School. Professor Strauss did his
undergraduate work at Harvard and his graduate work at Yale. He
clerked forJudge David Bazelon on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit and then for Justice Brennan. From 1968 to 1971, he
served as an assistant Solicitor General; he then joined the Columbia
Law faculty from which he took a leave of absence from 1975 to 1977
to serve as the General Counsel of the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion. See-we're touching all the bases now. He has been an active
member of the Administrative Conference of the United States, an
acting and contributing member of the Administrative Law Section
before it changed its name to Section of Administrative Law and Reg-
ulatory Practice, and has written extensively in the field of adminis-
trative law, specifically in the area of separation of powers. We welcome
Professor Strauss as he brings today his thoughts in closing.
PETER STRAUSS: Thank you, Sally. I will try to keep them short, as
the afternoon is getting late and I imagine you want some time for
questions and discussion-and that would be my favorite setting in
any event.
Yes, I was associated with the villainous NRC, even back in the good
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old days of the Ford and then Carter administration when the Sea-
brook disaster was being put on the road. And it was there that I got
my first taste of the complexities of this problem.
The NRC is a wonderful administrative agency from the advantage
of which to ask this question, because, among the other things it does,
it licenses exports of bomb material to foreign nations. Now it's not
bomb material when we send it out, but it might become bomb ma-
terial, nuclear bomb material, and that gives rise to a certain amount
of concern. Congress, in its wisdom, put this function in an indepen-
dent regulatory commission and told this independent regulatory com-
mission that it was to make the assessment whether national security
permitted or didn't permit sending this stuff off to, say, India. To do
this we had to have our own miniature CIA, we had our own little
State Department. We had some wonderful set-tos with the Depart-
ment of State; they thought they were in charge of foreign affairs
matters at the time. The conflicts and duplications of effort gave one
pause over the wisdom of the independent regulatory commission de-
vice.
My favorite event was when a bill was proposed to domesticate the
use of executive privilege. It wasn't too long after President Nixon's
resignation, and there was a certain amount of concern over executive
privilege, a reluctant willingness on the part of Congress to admit that
privilege could ever be claimed, but really quite reluctant. The idea
was to send up a bill that would require the President himself to sign
off before executive privilege could be claimed. We were, despite our
"independence," in the OMB loop to receive such proposed legislation
and, for some reason or other, my commissioners actually thought they
ought to wait to see what OMB said before they took certain kinds of
actions. So we got the bill. It said nothing about independent regula-
tory commissions being able to claim executive privilege. So, on behalf
of the agency, I sent a letter back to OMB-or perhaps it was to the
Department of Justice-saying, fellows, we hold in our safes nuclear
bomb plans, all kinds of sensitive data that we get from the Department
of State because they feel they have to persuade us whether to send
nuclear fuel to India or not, so forth and so on. We ought to be able
to claim executive privilege. And we got a letter back from the De-
partment of Justice declining to take that position. You are an inde-
pendent regulatory commission, it said, and you can't have executive
privilege. At which point the question put for today's discussion came
really quite sharp and clear: independent of whom?
As I suppose you may know from my writings (I think it sufficient
for these purposes to send you to them because time is short) my own
answer to that question is, independent of no one. I feel rather vin-
dicated by the Supreme Court's outcome in Morrison v. Olsen last spring.
I think they took just the right path. It is a path that says, in effect,
that separation of powers questions are questions of relationship more
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than they are questions of placement. It doesn't particularly matter
where you place or what you call an organization. The issue is whether
it is close enough to the President for one to believe that the President
is still in charge; close enough to the Congress for one to believe that,
so far as the Congress acts, that the Congress is still in charge; and, for
that matter, although the courts have been chary about saying it, close
enough to the courts. I think that legal analytic framework at last is
on a fairly good footing.
I find none of what we have learned from the previous speakers very
surprising. I don't imagine many of you find it surprising, either, al-
though you may have noticed, as I did, a curious modesty on the part
of some. Invited here to speak to the question "Independent of
Whom?," the representative from the Congress was heard to say "Well,
certainly not of the President!" and the representative of the President
was heard to say "Well, certainly not of the Congress!" and neither of
them spoke at all about their own branches' relations, as it were, which
one has then heard from our last two speakers are indeed significant.
Perhaps you may say, control is especially aggressive on the congres-
sional side-that certainly does seem to be the burden of the com-
ments we've heard. But then asJim Miller was, I think, candid enough
to remark, after all, the President had appointed him; he likely knew
what he was getting, and there are, as well, a lot of other important
levers in the presidential hands.
It hasn't always been quite this way. Sally's opening remarks on the
influence of politics on this question brings me to say the following: In
my judgment, the issue of independence is going to seem a lot less
important if the Congress and the President share political allegiance
then it will if they continue to be divided. That is to say, one of the
factors that has made this question so important over the past couple
of decades is that we've had predominantly a Congress dominated by
the Democrats and a White House dominated by Republicans, and this
has given rise to a good deal of tension, of infighting over who's in
control and of what. More than good administration, in the abstract,
is at stake. In this respect, one of my favorite anecdotes concerns the
reaction of the Federal Trade Commission and Congress to the orig-
inal decision in Humphrey's Executor. Franklin Roosevelt was certainly
assured that he would soon control the membership of the commis-
sions, but if you remember Humphrey's Executor, he wanted to get a
fast start toward getting a Democratic FTC, so he had invited Chair-
man Humphrey to leave, which he refused to do. Shortly after the
decision in that case, the Commission sent its budget directly to the
Congress saying, since we're an independent regulatory commission,
we don't have to cooperate with the President's budget bureau. They
thus denied being part of the process that Joe Grundfest rightly re-
minded us is a process for setting national priorities, in which one
would think that all organs of government played some role. Congress
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refused to stand for this. The act was promptly amended in 1939,
specifically to include any independent regulatory commission or board
among the agencies that were subject to the budget bureau's oversight.
And Representative Warren, a good Democrat I'm sure and a member
of the Select Committee on Governmental Organizations, explained
this measure to the House in the following words:
With respect to Title 11 of the Bill under the decision in the Humphrey
case, we have something new to appear down here in respect to some of
these agencies. They shrugged their shoulders and said, "we're not under
any budgetary control," quoting that case. Now all that Title II does is to
bring every single solitary one of them under budget control, and I believe
everybody in this House favors that.
That was, of course, a Democratic Congressman and a Democratic
administration making a good deal of administrative sense. One
wouldn't necessarily expect similar sentiments in a Democratic Con-
gress under a Republican presidency. Indeed, it strikes me that those
were not the kinds of sentiments we have heard today.
There are other ways in which this problem is an artifact of larger
politics. Taking the same point a little bit further, the fact of divided
political control seems to me to be part of the decision not to have a
parliamentary democracy here, not to join legislature and executive.
The struggle is over who is in charge to an extent that simply wouldn't
arise in Great Britain or France or Italy or any country that didn't
observe our peculiar political structure. There may be reasons for
wishing independence of politics in some agencies some of the time. I
think we heard those in Jim Miller's reference to the difference be-
tween adjudication and other functions, a difference that he said (and
it's my observation too) is rather easily sold to members of Congress
and to the White House both. Those may be reasons for wishing in-
dependence of politics but they're rather separate from the problems
that arise in connection with policymaking-rulemaking.
One other thing and then I'll stop. I think in some respects what
we're seeing is one outcropping of a general problem facing govern-
ment in the United States at the end of the twentieth century which
is-and the literature is showing up in a lot of talk, some of it more
theoretical than others-about the problem of the administrative state,
or, as I would put it, the problem of size-the size of the government
effort and the changes that have accompanied that. Look, for example,
at the way in which statutes now appear. Congress in 1893 passed a
statute about safety in railroad cars. In 1966 it passed a statute about
safety in automobile cars. The same problem; thousands of people
dying and being injured, property damage and the like; the same kind
of response; we have to be sure we'll get a safer vehicle out of this. But
in 1893, what Congress did was to say you have to have automatic
couplers, you have to have grab bars, you have to have power brakes,
the drawbars between the cars have got to meet each other. They
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actually solved the problems with which they were confronted. If you
go and read the debates you'll find that the Senators are actually talk-
ing to one another about the technical questions and policy issues raised.
In 1966 what the Congress said was: CARS! ACCIDENTS! SAFETY!
FIX IT!!, and appointed the National Highway Safety Transportation
Traffic Administration to do that. It's reflective of the general shift in
statute-making from what one scholar calls transitive statutes, statutes
that have an object, to intransitive statutes, those that merely set up a
process. Once you set up a process, you then have enormous issues of
control. Here's this process. How do we know whether it's producing
something that we like or not? And one sees another transformation.
Again, at the congressional level in 1947, the total committee staff of
the Congress was 399. In 1982 there were almost as many committees
as that-298-and there were 3,278 professional members of staff.
As recently as 1965, members of Congress were spending on the av-
erage one day a week in legislative research and reading. That figure
dropped within a decade to an hour a week in legislative research and
reading. They, too, are spending all of their time in control. A frag-
mentation of effort from legislation to oversight, from direct partici-
pation to an effort to control burgeoning staff, burgeoning problems.
In many respects what we've heard today is a reflection of that
change-a change that we have not directly confronted or decided
how to respond to most appropriately. Clearly, at least in a theoretical
light, we must do so. Nor do these problems concern only the Con-
gress. One could make remarks equally on the growth in staff in the
Office of Management and Budget, on the change in the analytic proc-
esses and oversight techniques of the executive branch. When we first
undertook environmental impact statements, we thought they made a
lot of sense. Economic impact analysis-yes, we can understand that
too. Since then we have developed regulatory flexibility analysis, and
then family impact analysis and federalism impact analysis-at some
point an impact analysis is called for! Again I submit to you that what
we are facing is a sea change from using the major institutions of our
government (President and Congress) in attempting directly to solve
public problems, to using them in an effort to control other inferior
institutions that we rely on to solve our problems. A proliferation of
distractions from the business of resolving the issues of government
that presents us with a major crisis.
SALLY KATZEN: Thank you, Peter. You have all been very patient.
You have heard now various different viewpoints. It is your turn. Either
make your own comments, observations, or raise any questions you
have. Comments please. Bill [Funk].
QUESTION: I worked for five years for the Department of Energy,
a cabinet department. It is interesting to hear various statements from
the independent regulatory people, independence from staff. Same
question. Are people from the old AEC hanging around various
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administrations, still doing the same thing, still carrying out their role,
who cares if it is the dentist or the former head of Coca-Cola that is
the head of the agency, we keep doing our thing. Same issues in the
cabinet department: private interest; special interest groups; the same
thing. Boy, I can think of the regulations that we didn't do because
the private interest got in there and stopped us first. There were some
differences because sometimes the executive came to our assistance.
On the other hand sometimes it was the executive who came and said
that the private interest group said to do this, do it. So it works both
ways. So I keep coming back to the question, what is the difference
between the independent agency and the executive department? I
thought that Peter's comment at the very end of his statement was that
all the things we are talking about really don't have anything to do
with independent versus nonindependent agencies, they have to do
with other aspects of governing the administrative state. So I have
always wondered about what is it that makes these agencies special,
and I always focus on the fact that there are more of you in the deci-
sionmaking process. In other words, you have a multimember group
that has to reach a decision by some sort of committee consensus thing
rather than a strictly hierarchical one man at the top/one woman at
the top who makes the decision. And when I look at the decisionmak-
ing processes, I see more difference between the systems in that aspect
rather than any other. I ask for your comments.
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: Well, I would start by saying not always.
The decisions are not always made. After all, we have executive branch
agencies that have, as we do, multimember groups, and we have single-
headed executive branch agencies that assert great independence at
times. I don't think it makes a great deal of difference. I agree with
you about the same pressures, the same influences, and that's why I
put my remarks in terms of who influences, and when, and what dif-
ference it makes. I don't think it makes a great deal of difference. If
it does make a difference, from my experience, the difference is that
the Congress is much more responsive and much more effective in
influencing than the executive branch is. Now that may just be another
aspect of a weakened executive.
QUESTION: I forgot to mention Congress, because when Mr.
Grundfest held his things from Congress, I was thinking-boy, are
you lucky! That's one letter from John Dingell in one week that we
would get.
PETER STRAUSS: There is a certain tattoo of commentary from peo-
ple who have been on independent regulatory commissions; and Jim
Miller said something like that to Cal Collier when he was Chairman
of the FTC. He said the difference in being in an independent regu-
latory commission is that you have a 535-person board of directors
and you are, in effect, naked before the Congress. I think what Jim
said is that you haven't got the protective shelter that the presidency
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can sometimes offer. But in terms of what is done, how it is done, and
what kind of pressures are you subject to, who communicates, what is
the problem, all that you have mentioned, no.
JOSEPH GRUNDrEST: I think another observation is in order.
Whether you look at the government or the private sector, students
of organization observe that you can't tell very much from the official
organization chart. I think that really is right. Much more depends on
the nature of the individuals involved, on specific relationships at in-
dividual agencies, on relationships with the Hill, and on relations with
the administration, than on an organization chart. We have a President
now who is well known for not liking to replace people for a wide
variety of reasons. In contrast, if you had a more Carteresque style of
management, involving stronger micromanagement and the like, I can
imagine a situation where, because it is easier for the president at least
in theory, and I also think in practice, to micromanage at an executive
branch agency than it is to reach out to an independent agency, then
it might actually make more of a difference. But if the administration
style is not oriented toward micromanagement and if it relies heavily
on delegation, it can be an excellent style, then there may not be much
of a difference.
SALLY KATZEN: Jim. [James T. O'Reilly]
QUESTION: My committee is struggling with an issue in which an
independent regulatory agency may have a different point of view than
some of the cabinet agencies which are promoting a particular prod-
uct. My question is, what is the balance of respect during a rulemaking
by either the independent agency for comments received from the
executive branch, or in a rulemaking by the executive branch agency
for comments received from the independent agency? How much re-
spect do you give each other and who should act as the, if you want to
call it, the honest broker? Should there be an OMB role for that, should
the President become involved in some way if there is a disagreement
on a rulemaking policy question involving either the independent
agency which is at loggerheads with the executive branch, or con-
versely the executive branch agency receiving strong disagreement
from an independent agency?
PETER STRAUSS: Let me respond to that, as I am not in the current
political setting. I don't think there is a formulaic answer to that. At
the NRC we had a lot of dealings with EPA. There is a regular process
for developing treaties between governmental agencies, a semi-public
process that we went through in attempting to develop memoranda of
understanding. You would go to OMB, which might be capable of
acting as an honest broker. They had somewhat less capacity to twist
our arm than they would have to twist the arm of, say, the Department
of the Interior. On the other hand, we knew that our budget estimates
were going to be going through them and we wanted senior executive
service grades or whatever other goodies they could give us. So it wasn't
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as if the difference was black and white. It seems to me that on this
issue, as with a number of others, a good part of the problem lies in
what I was suggesting in my questions to Jim before, which can only
be described as political cowardice on the part of the White House.
Maybe, you will think, well-advised political cowardice; that is to say,
that they shouldn't want to get into that kind of fight with the Con-
gress. Nonetheless, from a constitutional prospective, it is clearly the
President's function to coordinate issues of that character, and I would
say just as clearly from a legal perspective, he has got the authority to
do so. The Constitution says that he may demand the opinion in writ-
ing from the head of any executive department on any matter within
the responsibility of that department, and I cannot imagine any other
conclusion than that statement includes the SEC; and for that matter,
if the Chairman of the SEC were to thumb his nose at a presidential
request for such information and the President said "Go packing," the
Supreme Court that wrote Morrison and that wrote about dismissal for
cause in Bowsher v. Synar would say that that's cause, and the Chairman
was properly dismissed.
QUESTION: Could I ask if any of the commissioners have a point of
view?
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: Well, my answer to that is that I think it
depends on the issue. Are you really talking about a political decision
on the part of OMB or the White House, and depending upon how
much pressure is being exerted on both from those interest groups,
from the staff. And I think there are some issues that you would get a
very courageous White House on, and there are some issues that you
would get a White House that says, "Hey, who cares, you guys take
care of it all by yourselves." We are involved in such an issue right
now. The IRS has spoken and we know that neither OMB nor the
White House will support us, so we are going to go ahead and make
our regulations comport with the IRS regulations.
JOSEPH GRUNDFEST: I think, to a certain extent, it is always true
that when you get written comments in a rulemaking, you look at the
source of the comment and you weigh that in conjunction with the
substance of the comment. Very often you get comments from Amer-
ican Bar Association committees, and that does carry, believe it or
not-it may come as a surprise to some of you-a certain amount of
weight as coming from a group relatively expert in the area. I see a
lot of heads shaking at this point.
QUESTION: Are you a member of the ABA?
JOSEPH GRUNDFEST: I certainly am. I am a card-carrying member
of the ABA, but I am not running for President this year.
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: In some circles that could get you in a lot
of trouble.
JOSEPH GRUNDFEST: That's exactly right. Maybe next time I run,
I will have to disavow my membership. Can I have a copy of the tape?
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The only copy? I will burn it or maybe we can insert an eighteen-
minute gap. These gaps are not unusual. Actually, I think that every
agency does, to some extent, consider the source of the comments in
conjunction with the substance of the comment. When you get a com-
ment from a sister agency, or from Capitol Hill, or from the admin-
istration, you do pay special attention and think, "What's the reason
for this comment; is there any unstated rationale, is there any other
agenda at work?" You do want to take that information and put it
together with everything else.
REINIER LOCK: I am a legal adviser to one of the commissioners at
the FERC. We have heard a lot about the tremendous influence from
Capitol Hill on the regulatory agencies. I think I am going to swim
against the tide a little bit and suggest that that has been exaggerated
this afternoon. Maybe this is just the experience of one agency, and
this may seem an odd time for me to say this, havingjust come through
an eighteen-month battle-with being involved reluctantly in an eigh-
teen-month battle-to get my own Commissioner reappointed, and
certainly when five appointments are on the line, Capitol Hill has an
influence. But I think that that tends to be an exception. My sense is
that oversight hearings and the sorts of inquiries we get from Congress
have not been unduly influential. Yes, certainly, like other agencies we
tend to get the calls about individual Senators trying to get a hydro
application license or a cogeneration facility license. Again, I think the
threat of oversight hearings has not been massive. My own Commis-
sioner's remark is a good one. I think he said that threatening a com-
missioner with an oversight hearing on the Hill is like threatening to
throw water on a duck.
I think one thing that has been overlooked in terms of influence of
the executive, and I think it is a very positive influence, has been the
intervenor role of agencies like the Department of Energy and the
Department ofJustice-certainly, in the informal rulemaking, and oc-
casionally in the adjudicatory cases as well. To my mind, that has done
far more to fashion major rulemaking initiatives such as those in the
natural gas area than has the influence from the White House, or 0MB,
or from Capitol Hill. I think there is one important missing ingredient.
The only point-which I would like to make is one of the real problems,
and maybe the real question for an agency like FERC is how to effec-
tively interact with other agencies, both in the federal government and
at the state level and even now I think with the National Energy Board
of Canada as we move towards a sort of meshing, if not overlapping
of jurisdictions and meshing of jurisdictions. It is apparently very dif-
ficult for FERC and the SEC to talk to each other meaningfully about
matters such as FASB 92. It is extremely difficult for FERC to talk to
the FTC about major mergers in the natural gas area. To me that is
one of the most difficult and unexplored areas every time. An exam-
ple, the FTC staff came and tried to involve my Commissioner in an
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investigation of a merger and my general counsel's office basically pre-
vailed upon us to get out of it. It just got too messy for a sitting com-
missioner to do that. I would be interested if any of the panelists have
any comments on that difficult question of effective interaction be-
tween the federal agencies.
JOSEPH GRUNDFESr: We have a specific problem at the SEC. Peo-
ple have said that the crash was either caused or exacerbated by the
lack of coordination between the SEC and CFTC and you should solve
that problem by not having two separate agencies. In that particular
case, I have not had that much of a problem. I have good personal
relations with the members of the CFTC. I know the staffers over
there, and when an issue comes up, I haven't perceived any difficulty
in their picking up the phone, giving me a call, complying with all
regulations, and putting the appropriate stuff in the public file if it is
necessary.
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: Well, I think it gets back to Peter's func-
tional analysis: There are certain things you need coordination on and
you need a way to do just that. It is not a problem that we run into
very often.
PETER STRAUSS: There is one possible complicating factor if what
one is talking about is not commissioner-to-commissioner contact, but
commission-to-commission contact and that through the Government
in the Sunshine Act, which isjust another example of the ways in which,
by taking up space in the 24-hour day, oversight techniques have man-
aged to reduce the amount of energy that is available for administra-
tion.
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: I would like to go back to your comment
about oversight and the duck to water. It seems to me that that makes
our point. The reason it is like a duck to water is that they are so used
to it.
QUESTION: It started in the fifties when what used to be collegial
independent agencies became agencies where the head of the agency
was appointed by the President as a permanent position, an observa-
tion, and I would like yours, that has significantly changed the rela-
tionships between the Congress and the executive branch and the
independent regulatory agencies. The Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion with eleven Commissioners used to have as its chairman each year
the most senior member who had not been chairman before, and no
decision was made except collegially, and staff was hired collegially so
that a presidential appointment did not only select ideologies, if that
happens to be the word of the day, to fill the agency to carry out its
new mandate as seen by the head of that independent agency. And
secondly, the last letter I got from AARP said, "on behalf of our 21
million members, .... " and I don't just think that is a small interest
group whose views should not be seriously considered and in the issue
you raise in the labor-protective field with which I happen to be fa-
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miliar, it has been almost academic that no worker is ever permitted
to make a decision on a lump sum payment on anything-whether
workmen's compensation, or retirement or any of those decisions with-
out having a tribunal review it, and at the Department.of Labor, we're
forced to do so in an open record for the hearing.
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: Under the FLSA that is true, but it's not
true in terms of general labor and employment discrimination law. It
is certainly not true under Title VII. The purpose of the FLSA is very,
very different. Our case is really like a person settling a claim with an
insurance company. You are talking about a claim, an asserted claim.
QUESTION: My only purpose in raising that was that it didn't sur-
prise me that the AARP would take a position and, given its size, would
have more than reasonable support in an area to make a case that
would be very significant, whether on the Hill or in the executive. I
mean, I am surprised that you were surprised.
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: It did not surprise us either, and its seems
to me that that influence was perfectly legitimate. Whether or not it
was good in terms of policymaking is a different question. But it was
certainly legitimate. If I left the impression that it was less than legit-
imate, that was unintended. Nor did I say it was a small group.
QUESTION: Could I get the comments, though, on my first obser-
vation. I am interested particularly, Peter, in your view because you
have watched this over, what, 30 years.
PETER STRAUSS: I don't know if it has been that long. It feels that
long, on occasion. I think you are right that there has been in recent
years something of a tendency to identify the chair of an independent
regulatory commission as a person distinct from the remainder of the
commission and having much more authority over day-to-day man-
agement of the commission, including staffing decisions. Sometimes
that can be more of a legal than a practical political matter if you are
on a small body of, let's say, five highly egotistical individuals, each of
whom who thinks that they are contributing significantly to the public
good, and your position as their leader is to say consistently to them,
" know you are interested in who the General Counsel is, but that is
my decision," "I know you are interested in who the staff director is,
but that is my decision." You may find that after a while you don't do
so well in the matters on which they are entitled to sit. My own judg-
ment is that this appropriately reflects a kind of connection to the
President that is, in fact, necessary and called for in the curious struc-
ture of government that we have. The President is entitled to a person,
as it were, on the commission and the person who is most in charge
of, if you like, the executive affairs of that commission. It has the ten-
dency to turn his fellow commissioners or her fellow commissioners
into judges/senators who sit to decide cases and enact rules but do not
run the day-to-day work of the agency. Well, that's a model I could
live with. But I think you are right, the change has occurred.
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SALLY KATZEN: Paul [Verkuil]
QUESTION: It seems to me that the following proposition is true.
Let's see. All commissions are not independent agencies. On the other
hand, all independent agencies are commissions. Now that leads you
to ask the question, and this is what Bill Funk asked at the outset-
does it make a difference in terms of independence whether you are
talking about a commission or a single-headed organization, and that
also brings in the chairman question. It seems to me originally that
when independent agencies primarily adjudicated, it made sense that
they should be commissions because they were supposed to be like
courts, like this court here, an Article I tribunal. And you wanted
group decisionmaking, you wanted consensus, you wanted to have a
little discussion, you know, and the ideal like we have appellate panels,
and that made a lot of sense. Then when the commissions started doing
things like policymaking and rulemaking and other things, it got very
cumbersome. Indeed, I think that is one of the reasons why the chair-
man has been given more power-because it makes sense to have
someone running the show when you have got all of these commissions
(and maybe you can help on that because you are commissioners), you
need someone to make these decisions. And it would be nice especially
from the executive's point of view if you could call up an individual
and say "Look, how about let's get this through, we need some work."
I think that makes sense.
Now the question becomes, if that makes sense, wouldn't it make
more sense to eliminate commissions altogether, at least with respect
to the nonadjudicative function, and just to have single-headed inde-
pendent agencies for purposes of making many of these decisions? In-
terestingly, the legislature, I guess the investigation about the NRC's
ineffectiveness, has come down to recommendations that say it
shouldn't be a commission. The reason why, and I think this Rogoven
and even maybe the Cammady Commissions both said that, the prob-
lem is that you don't have any decisive decisionmaking. You have got
safety problems. You have these five commissioners, and they are all
passing the buck. No one wants to do anything. They are all afraid of
getting beat over the head by Congress, so as a result, nothing happens.
So you just need a single czar-the old notion that someone can run
the commission. Even Congress, which I assume, created a commission
because it sort of diffuses powers and gives them more influence and
it firms up the terms for people, seems to be receptive to a reorgani-
zation of the NRC along these lines. Does it make sense in the policy
area, I guess, to have commissions, or wouldn't we be more effective
if we had single-headed agencies?
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: I think it makes sense. I think your idea
makes sense. I did when I read the paper, which, by the way, is coming
out in the Duke Law Journal, and you all should look for the Duke Law
Journal issue on this subject. But I don't think it is going to happen.
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The fact that Congress says it is fine for the NRC I think may be a
relatively special circumstance. When you create an agency with a sin-
gle head in order to have more efficient (and that is what you are really
talking about) policymaking, then, it seems to me that you are inevi-
tably and ineluctably taking power away from Congress and giving it
to the executive, and I just don't see that as very likely.
JOSEPH GRUNDFEST: I also think that it is very hard to generalize
in that situation. We at the SEC right now, for example, are involved
in a rulemaking process where we are trying to craft a notice for pro-
posed rulemaking. From my perspective at least, our result is going to
be far better because we are going to have a result of consensus, com-
promise, and hard work involving Ed Fleischman, Dave Rudder and
Charles Cox. I might even contribute my two cents worth. I think the
net result of the four of us trying to push together in the same direc-
tion, bringing different perspectives, different concerns, different ar-
ticulation of legal principles and the like, will lead to a richer document,
particularly in the proposing stages. As a result, the release is likely to
stimulate better comments, better responses and will, I hope, lead to
a better final rule down the road, if there is going to be a rule rather
than the situation that would result if any one of us were to write the
release on his own. I alone could not achieve the result that will come
as a result of the cooperation among the four of us. Ed couldn't do it
alone, Dave couldn't do it alone, and Charles couldn't do it alone. That
is an example of how collegiality, when properly applied, can be ben-
eficial in the rulemaking process. Granted, it doesn't always work that
way.
PETER SrRAUSS: I agree with that. This issue of shifting from multi-
headed to single-headed organizations has arisen any number of
times-well, at least two-the Ash Commission was the most recent
proposal. And no one has ever been able to demonstrate that, in fact,
single-member bodies are more proficient in developing regulations
or effecting policies or securing public ends than multi-member com-
missions or vice versa. It seems to me that one of the ghosts that stalks
this particular issue, one Congressman Markey came closest to men-
tioning, is the ghost of personnel. Who is going to do it? Give me the
right single commissioner, okay, maybe. But it is also easier to get a
single commissioner resembling one of the several members of staff
whom I observed when I was general counsel of the NRC. The staff
problems thatJoe Grundfest had were very much in evidence then and
it was clear that one of the major problems was getting controversy
past the people who thought they were czars over a particular area.
Put a single commissioner in place who is going to be a czar in that
area and you don't learn things that you might learn-in that com-
mission, perhaps, in particular.
Let us also go back to the proposition that it had so much to do. The
original Nuclear Regulatory Commission had among its five members
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a lawyer with a great deal of regulatory experience in the course of
his career, a lot of it at the AEC but not all of it at the AEC; a chemical
engineer; a former colonel of the Army who had spent a lot of time in
the country's intelligence and security apparatus; a physicist who had
spent a lot of time at the Rand Corporation doing systems studies of
various sorts; and a former astronaut with major management and
leadership skills. You couldn't have found those qualities in one per-
son. When they weren't arguing about what the insignia of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission should be (because egos do get in the way)
and were instead addressing themselves to serious subjects, as Com-
missioner Grundfest suggests, they produced a work product that was
considerably enriched as compared with a single head.
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: You are talking about economic tradeoffs,
tradeoffs between efficiency and coordination.
PETER STRAUSS: You substitute five political bazookas for those
five people, and you are in a lot of trouble.
JOSEPH GRUNDFEST: The point about the staff-the SEC, for rea-
sons that I don't understand, has the most amazing staff imaginable.
You could take-and we are not about to do this, so don't get any
ideas-you could take the staff of the SEC, and if we left the govern-
ment and opened up our own shop, I think we would have one of the
top ten law firms in the country on day one. We have got people in
that building that we know can leave today and go to New York. At a
minimum, if they take the low bid they would get ten times the salary
that they are making at the Commission today. The point that I made
about the staff tending to be more sensitive to Congress is not a criti-
cism of the staff at all. It is a reality that the staff tends to deal solely
with Congress. You do not get the administration calling our Division
of Investment Management or Market Regulation or the Division of
Enforcement or Corporation Finance. The only action response func-
tion, as a practical matter, is programmed from Capitol Hill, and over
time I think that has a cumulative effect. I do not mean to denigrate
in the least a staff that is so good that I find hard to believe that it is
there, but I just mean to point out that in terms of an institutional
Pavlovian response, the stimulus at the staff always comes from the
Hill, and as far as I can tell, virtually never from the administration.
QUFSTION: But isn't there an iron triangle problem? I certainly
heard the kinds of thing that Bill Funk says he heard at the Energy
Department, at the NRC, that civil service bureaucrats-maybe you
are lucky at the SEC and just don't have any-are there for the long
term and over time, they develop relationships with Congress that they
know how to work.
JOSEPH GRUNDFEST: We certainly have some of that, but by the
same token, we have some of the most absolutely amazing indepen-
dent-minded individuals who will go up to Capitol Hill and will look
Mr. Markey and Mr. Dingell in the eye and say, "Gentlemen, with all
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due respect, you are very wrong, and here is the reason why."
SALLY KATZEN: We have time for two very short questions. Charlie
[Ablard] was standing and Arthur [Bonfield] had his hand up. So, if
we can have your quick questions, please.
QUESTION: Aside from the various talents that you have so elo-
quently spoken about on the different commissions, it strikes me, first
of all, that this country has never been terribly fond of czars. The other
point that hasn't been discussed, and I wonder whether any of the
members of the panels see any particular merit, or is it just irrelevant,
is the bipartisanship of the various commissions and the fact that they
are required to have a bipartisan complexion. Does this hurt, help, or
is it neutral?
PETER STRAUSS: I think it damps policy swings somewhat, as some-
one points out, two or three years into an administration and you prob-
ably can't tell the difference any more.
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: I would disagree with that. I don't think
that any of us are saying that commissions always make good decisions.
PETER STRAUSS: And they don't always make worst decisions.
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: And they don't always make the worst de-
cisions. That's right. As far as the bipartisanship is concerned, Charlie,
in my experience, even after eight years (we now have a Reagan-ap-
pointed bipartisan commission), those Reagan Democrats are still
Democrats, and they still have certain policy differences with some of
the Reagan Republicans. I think that is probably all to the good, par-
ticularly in an area like ours that is involved in rights.
SALLY KATZEN: Arthur, last question.
QUESTION: This Section of the ABA, as well as on record, is favor-
ing as a general proposition a better means of policy formulation, and
we have a long history supporting that. I was fascinated by your com-
ments, Commissioner Silberman, with respect to what happened when
members of your commission, from your perception, were beat up in
the political process, causing them to prefer ad hoc adjudication in-
crementalism, which is a general proposition again. I think it is a poor
way of making policy for a whole bunch of reasons. And my question,
I guess, is since you have been at the vortex of this and have suffered
from it, how can we handle the problem of inducing more rulemaking,
but at the same time keep the agencies responsible? We can't isolate
the agencies, after all, from that political pressure, because that is a
legitimate and important part of keeping them responsive, which point
I was making with Miller with respect to Nino Scalia's position. How
can we do that and at the same time keep agencies from prefering
adjudication where there isn't as much opportunity for broad public
input, and which, as a general proposition, is not a good way of poli-
cymaking.
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: Well, let me start by saying I don't think
that you really can keep agencies from preferring adjudication. I think
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that is just human nature; it is easier. I have done a lot of thinking
about the rulemaking that I spoke of, which was born in my office,
and what has happened with that rulemaking, may answer your ques-
tion. That was an incident where you had a very vocal and seemingly
very large interest group that had a very particular point of view and
made that point of view known and was quite effective. There was no
countervailing interest that was voiced because, frankly, although the
gentleman is surprised that I was surprised, everyone was surprised
that the AARP came up with this point of view. This was a point of
law that seemed to be accepted across-the-board. We were merely cod-
ifying the Sixth Circuit court's opinion on this issue. So what happened
when the suspension of the rule through the appropriations process
came up, some of the companies and some of the people who had
gotten these very enhanced early retirement benefits, got quite upset
at the fact that not only was our rulemaking being stopped, but the
policy was going to be implemented in terms of an appropriations rid-
er. And right now a big battle is going on on the Hill, and that is where
it should be going on. If that battle is won by the people who think the
rule is a good idea, we might be more likely in the future to engage in
rulemaking on controversial subjects. I don't know. Democracy is, after
all, messy. And rulemaking is one of the ways you administrative law-
yers and judges have figured out you can make it a little better, a little
bit easier, and use the experts. All I am telling you is that it doesn't
always work, but I think that every time that it does work, we all are
a little bit better off.
QUESTION: The troublesome thing about it though, of course, as
you point out, it works which means to some extent that the political
process does get levied in, it discourages the agency from doing it
again.
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: No, I don't think so. No, I didn't mean to
say that. Listen, this is very political. I am a political appointee. We are
talking about politics in the best sense of the word, as long as everybody
gets into the mix. But this was done at midnight and in the appropri-
ations process. There were no hearings, there were none of the things
that are important for rulemaking. I think as long as it's done in the
open and everybody gets in there (and if they care about it, they get
in, and if they don't, fine), that's okay. I am there to do what I think
is right and to reflect what I think is the political consensus. But I have
to hear what comes into that consensus, and what happened in both
of those instances I mentioned was that the information was cut off
from me, and I think that's wrong.
QUESTION: But the danger from my point of view, and I won't say
another word, is that because the rulemaking process appropriately
invites the political process in, agencies become chary of using rule-
making and they adjudicate, they make policy by adjudication.
R. GAULL SILBERMAN: I can't agree with you more. I have spent
FALL 1989
532 41 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 491
four years fighting it, and I hope to go and fight the good fight for a
little bit longer, but I just wanted all of you to be aware of some of the
problems that come up.
SALLY KATZEN: It is very unusual when Arthur does not get the
last word. I want to compliment Vice Chairman Silberman for bring-
ing that about. I would like to compliment all of our panelists for being
such superb participants and providing thoughtful commentary on a
difficult question.
